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Cooperative behavior depends on cultural environment, so what happens when people
move from to a new culture governed by a new norm? The dynamics of culture-induced
cooperation has not been well understood. We expose lab participants to a sequence of
different subject pools while playing a constrained Trust Game. We find prior exposure
to different subject pools does in fact influence cooperative behavior; first impressions
matter—the primacy effect plays a stronger role than the recency effect; and selfish first
impressions matter more than cooperative first impressions—observing selfish behavior
by others had a longer-lasting and greater influence on behaviors than observing
cooperative behavior by others. Moreover, three consecutive exposures to cooperative
environments were needed to neutralize one exposure to a selfish environment.
Keywords: trust, moral licensing, primacy, recency, corporate culture, social norms
INTRODUCTION
Cultural norms shape behaviors, but cultural norms are not static. An individual may move from
a selﬁsh cultural environment to a cooperative cultural environment and vice versa. Moving to
live in another culture has become increasingly common for much of the world’s population, even
becoming a way of life for some (Oishi, 2014). Today many people live in a culture drastically
diﬀerent from the one they grew up in. Even within a single culture, people operate under diﬀerent
norms in diﬀerent spheres of their life: home, school, work, etc. They juggle betweenmultiple social
roles. Sometimes people change the place where they work and have to adapt their behaviors based
on their observations of the new environment. Moreover, cultural norms can change within ﬁrms
or organizations or in society as a whole. Groups may shift from being cooperative to being selﬁsh
when competition and stresses are high, or they may change from selﬁsh to cooperative. When
we come to a new environment or encounter a new situation, how will the norms encountered in
previous situations continue to aﬀect our choices?
Descriptive cultural norms are the observations people make of what is commonly done in a
particular culture (e.g., most people don’t litter). In this research, we focus on the dynamic impact
of changing descriptive norms by providing participants an opportunity to observe and participate
in settings with diﬀerent norms of behavior. Our mechanism seeks to understand the impact of
conformity and social inﬂuence (Becker, 1991; Bernheim, 1994; for a review, see Moscovici, 1985)
as subjects change environments.
Behavior is not only a product of currently activated cultural norms (Bicchieri, 2006). Instead it
can also be aﬀected by previously encountered cultural norms. A substantial literature has tried to
ascertain the impact of exposures to diﬀerent societal norms by looking at immigrants’ behavior,
and how and when immigrants conform to the normative behaviors of their country of origin or
to the normative behavior of their new home. For example, Borjas (2000) shows that immigrants’
economic achievement can be predicted by which country they originally came from. Social norms
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regarding misconduct can also be carried over from the home
culture to the host culture. In a lab setting such as ours, Cox et al.
(1991) found that behavior of immigrant minority groups in a
prisoners’ dilemma game adhered to domestic norms in neutral
conditions, but behaved more like their home culture when cued
to think about their minority identity.
Selﬁsh norms seem to be longer lasting and more impactful
than cooperative norms. Research has uncovered possible
asymmetry between the persistence of selﬁsh cultural norms as
environments change compared to the persistence of cooperative
social norms. In a study investigating the inﬂuence of home
culture norms on diplomatic parking tickets issued to UN
employees in New York City (Fisman and Miguel, 2007),
diplomats stationed in New York who come from a country
with high corruption levels received more unpaid parking tickets
than diplomats from countries with low corruption levels.
Importantly, socialization to the local norm would predict a
decline in the rate of parking violations over time for those
from high-corruption countries and an increase in parking
violations for those from low-corruption countries. Results
show the violations frequency did increase with tenure in
New York City for diplomats from low-corruption countries.
However, diplomats from high-corruption countries did not
show declining parking violations over time. While part of their
ﬁndings can be explained by the enforcement environment,
substantial variation in the behavior of diplomats can likely still
be attributed to norms. While prior evidence of an asymmetry
about the lasting impact of selﬁsh versus cooperative norms
is limited, the Fisman and Miguel (2007) provides suggestive
evidence that negative social norms may be more powerful and
stickier than positive social norms.
The motivating literature for our experimental design lends
itself to two sets of questions. The ﬁrst set asks which set of
cultural norms does an individual adhere to when confronted
with a sequence of norms from multiple environments. The
second asks whether cooperative norms or selﬁsh norms aremore
inﬂuential.
To compare with ﬁndings reviewed in the previous section, the
primacy eﬀect represents the impact of one’s home environment,
whereas the recency eﬀect represents the impact of one’s current
environment. Which eﬀect dominates depends on the strength
of each stimulus, but in our setting, we expect that the novelty
of the ﬁrst environmental exposure will make primacy stronger
than the most recent environmental exposure. We expect this
for two reasons. (1) We respond proportional to the novelty
of the stimulus. By the time the subject is exposed to the last
treatment, the treatment may have become boring and thus
the subject may pay less attention to it. (2) Participants in
lab experiments tend exhibit a lot of inertia in their behavior.
Once they have established a pattern after the ﬁrst treatment,
it becomes more diﬃcult for latter stimuli to change that
pattern.
The second set of hypotheses compares the diﬀerence in the
strength of the primacy eﬀect with the counteracting inﬂuence
of recent exposures. These hypotheses were inspired by the
Fisman and Miguel (2007) ﬁnding that people are more likely to
assimilate to more selﬁsh norms, than more cooperative norms.
The asymmetric persistence between cooperative versus selﬁsh
norms can be seen through the lens of moral licensing (Sachdeva
et al., 2009; Klotz and Bolino, 2012). In a public goods game
where participants learned that others were either more moral or
less moral than themselves, Ho et al. (2015) found that people
were more likely to respond to information that licensed their
own selﬁsh behavior, rather than information that demanded
cooperation. Thus, we hypothesize that when exposed to both a
cooperative environment and a selﬁsh environment, the selﬁsh
eﬀects are more likely to persist.
In this study, we investigate one facet of cultural change:
the impact of moving from a selﬁsh environment to a
cooperative environment compared to the impact of moving
from a cooperative environment to a selﬁsh environment.
Cultural norms are diﬃcult to manipulate precisely in the lab
(Rousseau, 1990; Marcoulides and Heck, 1993; Schein, 1996). As
a result, researchers have relied on ethnographic observations or
questionnaire surveys to study cultural norms in organizations
(e.g., Schall, 1983; Hofstede et al., 1990; Rousseau, 1990; Schein,
1990; O’Reilly et al., 1991; Chatterjee et al., 1992). Although
such observational studies are informative and inspiring, their
methods are not well suited for causal inference.
However, there is a more recent tradition of studying culture
in a lab context by exposing participants to the play style
of others while playing economic games. For example, Falk
et al. (2003) and Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) isolate the
conformity eﬀect from reciprocity by exposing participants
to information about diﬀerent groups in order to argue that
conformity was driven by social norms, rather than economic
incentives. More recently, a number of studies have used similar
methods to develop the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (Rand
et al., 2012, 2014; Peysakhovich and Rand, 2015). They varied
subjects’ experiences in lab settings while playing economic
games, to argue that people develop ﬂexible social heuristics
that change as they learn through experience. While culture is
certainly much more complicated that simple social heuristics
and social norm conformity, these lab methods have allowed for
controlled experimentation on these important components of
culture.
Therefore, we create an experimental setting to manipulate
participant’s perceived cultural norms—as motivated by Cialdini
et al.’s (2006) deﬁnition of descriptive norms—to allow us to
examine the dynamics of this one dimension of culture in a
controlled and novel way.We give up realism in order to precisely
manipulate the variables of interest.
In our design the same participant observes and plays as the
responder in a constrained trust game across diﬀerent cultural
environments. Some participants encountered a cooperative
environment ﬁrst and then a selﬁsh environment. Others
encountered a selﬁsh environment and then a cooperative
one. To achieve this, participants played a constrained trust
games with students from several diﬀerent universities. In
order for participants to learn about the cultural norms
governing each environment, participants were allowed to
observe interactions by others in each new environment they
were placed into before participants play the game in that
environment themselves.
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One concern of manipulating perception of norms in the
lab is that we would ideally like to disentangle the eﬀects of
norms from the eﬀect of training. It is a well-established ﬁnding
that cooperation in experimental games tends to decline with
repeated play, often attributed to learning (Isaac et al., 1994).
Recent work has shown that the tendency toward selﬁsh behavior
can be counteracted by the establishment of norms (Reuben and
Riedl, 2013). Our experimental design only compares behavior of
participants with the same length of exposure to the game, which
should hold training eﬀects constant. An additional concern in
our design is that the changing environments could be construed
as feedback for past behavior. Diﬀerences in feedback may aﬀect
learning. However, our design was careful to emphasize that the
information provided applies only to the new environment they
will be playing next, and was not related to the set of choices they
just made. Manipulation checks showed that subjects did indeed
use the normative information we provided to make inferences
about the new school they matched with next.
Another concern for manipulating perception of norms is
that individuals diﬀer in the standards they apply in judging
others’ behavior, so experimental manipulation needs to be
tailored to each individual’s moral standards. For example, a
highly cooperative individual may consider an act as selﬁsh,
whereas a highly selﬁsh individual may consider the same
act as cooperative. In order to control for the variation in
behavior standards and maximize the power of our experimental
design, the interactions students were shown were selected based
on their own past behavior. Blanco et al. (2010) argue that
a subject deﬁnes as “kindness” any observed behavior where
others act more pro-socially than the subject would have acted
herself. Using this idea, we created a “cooperative” environment,
by selectively showing interactions where 80% of the others
respondedmore pro-socially that the subject had in a pre-test. We
created a “selﬁsh” environment by showing interactions where
80% of the others responded more selﬁshly. This allows the
experimental manipulation to be tailored to each individual’s
moral standards and was done in a way that exposure to a
cooperative environment and a selﬁsh environment was perfectly
symmetrical for each subject.
Two studies were conducted to examine the eﬀect of dynamic
cultural norms, with Study 1 examining whether norm changes
inﬂuence the level of cooperativeness and Study 2 examining how
long normative inﬂuences persist.
STUDY 1: PRIMACY versus RECENCY
Method
Participants
One-hundred students (65% female, 35%male) from Sun Yat-sen
University participated in the study for a ¥10 payment plus 1% of
the payment earned from the economic game they played. Their
ages ranged from 18 to 25 years (M = 20.26, SD = 1.55). This
sample size was determined based on pilot work that indicated
the magnitude of the expected eﬀect. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of four groups that were exposed to diﬀerent
cultural environments in diﬀerent orders: CS (cooperative then
selﬁsh; n = 25); SC (selﬁsh then cooperative; n = 25), CC
(cooperative in both rounds; n = 25), and SS (selﬁsh in both
rounds; n = 25). This study was approved by the Sun Yat-Sen
University Human Research Ethics Committee. All participants
were fully informed of the nature of the experiment and signed
an informed consent to participate and gave permission to use
their data. Participants were also recruited in partnership with
four other university labs to serve as Investors for our participants
who each gave consent for their data to be used for experiments,
however, our analysis is exclusively on the behavior of the
Receivers.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. Upon entering the
laboratory, each participant was escorted to a private subject
room. After completing consent forms, they were given
instructions which ensured them their personal identity would
remain anonymous. Participants were told they would interact
with other students from other universities when playing the
game.
After reading and signing consent forms, participants were
given instructions on the game they were about to play. They were
told there would be two roles in the game: Investor and Receiver.
Each round of the game involves two players, an Investor and a
Receiver. Participants were told they were assigned to play as a
Receiver.
Participants then read a description of the game. The Investor
was given ¥10 and then the Investor would give the ¥10 to the
Receiver. Our game description is a little diﬀerent from the trust
game developed by Berg et al. (1995) in that the investor is not
given a choice to invest or not. The game is framed in a way that
participants assume that all the investors would give ¥10 to the
Receiver. So the game is akin to a Dictator Game (Kahneman
et al., 1986) where the Receiver acts as the dictator, but framed
as a Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995). This framing was used
because we are particularly interested in the cultural norms of
reciprocity.
When the investor gives the ¥10 to the Receiver, the ¥10 is
tripled. Thus, the participant receives ¥30 in total. The participant
then must decide how much of the ¥30, if any, to return to the
Investor. The instructions state the participant could return any
amount, from ¥0 to ¥30. Any amount not returned became the
basis of the participant’s payoﬀ for that round in the game.
The instructions informed participants they would make
decisions in many rounds but they would always play in a role
of Receiver. We emphasized that in each round, they would
be playing with diﬀerent investors, and that these investors
were from diﬀerent universities. Participants would not be
given the exact names of these universities. Following the
instructions, participants completed a “quiz” designed to ensure
they understood key aspects of the procedures. A research
assistant was available to address any misunderstandings or
confusion.
Experimental conditions
Participants played the game with students from four diﬀerent
universities. They played ten rounds of the game with students
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from each university and each round was played with a diﬀerent
investor. That is, students played with students from University
1 for 10 rounds, those from University 2 for 10 rounds, those
fromUniversity 3 for 10 rounds, and ﬁnally those fromUniversity
4 for 10 rounds (see Figure 1, for example). For University 2
and University 3, we had extra information to show participants
before they played. We showed participants the play records of
other students from University 2 and University 3 playing the
game amongst themselves, so that our participants could view
the amount of payment returned when two other students were
playing the game (see Figure 2, for example). Before playing
with students from University 2, participants viewed ten rounds
of previous game play among students from University 2 (i.e.,
both Investor and Receiver were from University 2). The same
was true before they played with University 3. Participants were
told speciﬁcally that the students they played the game with
were diﬀerent from the ones who were playing in the recorded
interaction, but were from the same university.
These recordings were actual recordings selected from a data
pool created by having other university students play the game
amongst themselves. They were selected to show students either
a more cooperative environment or a more selﬁsh environment
than the student’s baseline behavior.
For participants in the C-S condition, they would ﬁnd
Receivers fromUniversity 2 typically behaved fairly and Receivers
from University 3 typically behaved selﬁshly in the video that
participants viewed. For those in the S-C condition, University
2 was selﬁsh and University 3 was cooperative. For those in the
S-S and C-C conditions, University 2 and 3 were both selﬁsh or
both cooperative.
A typical session proceeded as follows. Each session lasted
approximately 1 h. First, participants played ten rounds as the
responder with diﬀerent investors from University 1 (without
learning any information about University 1 before play).
Their decisions from this round were used as the basis for
constructing a cooperative environment or a selﬁsh environment
for them to view later. If they were assigned to a condition
that involved ten rounds in a cooperative environment, we
randomly selected 8 interaction decisions from the data pool
that were each 1 yuan more than participant’s own decisions.
For the remaining two trials, we selected interaction decisions
from the data pool that were each 1 yuan less than participants’
FIGURE 1 | Example of a single round for the Trust Game. Each round began with a 12s waiting for partner. The participant then saw the head portrait (created
by the authors using software Corel painter 12, Corel software, 2011) of their partner for 10s. Next, participants saw the amount of payment returned by the partner
for 6s, after which they decided how much money they would transfer to the partner.
FIGURE 2 | Example of a single round for the video. Each round lasted 39s. Each round began with a 12s waiting for partner. The participant then viewed the
head portrait of two players (Player A and Player B) for 10s. Next, participants viewed the amount of payment returned by the Player A for 6s, after which Player B
decided how much money they would transfer to Player A for a further 6s.
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own decisions to show. On the other hand, if they were to
view ten rounds in a selﬁsh environment, we randomly selected
eight interaction decisions from the data pool that were 1
yuan less. For the remaining two, we used interactions that
were 1 yuan more. The presentation order in the slides view
was randomized so no participants suspected the manipulation.
This manipulation was designed to maximize the power of the
treatment conditions by ensuring a selﬁsh environment was
always more selﬁsh than participants’ initial tendencies and
a cooperative environment was always more cooperative than
participants’ initial tendency.
As a manipulation check, we recruited 40 additional
undergraduate students and assigned them to the same four
treatments. After they were exposed to each ten round recording
we asked “When you viewed ten rounds from previous game
playing among students from University 2, did you think the
Receivers fromUniversity 2 behaved fairly? Responses weremade
using a scale from 1 (very selﬁsh) to 7 (very cooperative).”
Participants in the cooperative condition reported perceiving
the people they played with to be more cooperative (M = 5.33,
SD = 1.42) than did participants in the selﬁsh condition
[M = 2.58, SD= 1.36), t(78)= 8.85, p< 0.001.
Payment and debriefing
Following previous work (Bottom, 1998), the instructions
explained that participants will receive a ¥10 base payment plus
1% of the money they earned from the experimental games so
it was important they consider each decision very carefully. At
the end of the study, participants were paid an average of ¥18
(the range was from ¥14 to ¥22). Afterward, the experimenter
explained the study in detail and assessed each participant’s
suspicion using a funnel brieﬁng procedure.
Dependent measure
Our dependent measures were four indexes of cooperativeness,
measured by the average amount per round returned to
students from each of the four universities across 10 rounds.
Participants played games with those from University 1 ﬁrst and
University 4 last. Participants did not observe any information
about University 1 and University 4 before they played with
students from those schools. Preferences for cooperation with
students from University 4 should not be directly aﬀected by
observations for University 2 or 3. In contrast, participants
observed recordings from University 2 and University 3 so their
cooperativeness with students from these two schools might
be inﬂuenced by desires to conform to the behavior norms
in those schools. We use the average amount they returned
to investors from University 1 as the baseline cooperativeness
measure and the average amount returned to University 4,
the ﬁnal cooperativeness measure, as the dependent variable of
interest.
Results
Figure 3 and Table 1 reported four cooperativeness indices
(i.e., average return amounts) for each of the four universities
the students played with. As can be seen from Figure 3, the
initial cooperativeness level was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent among
groups, F(3,96) = 0.66, p> 0.250.
FIGURE 3 | Average return amounts of participants from each of the four universities across 10 rounds in Study 1. Error bars represent the standard error
of the mean.
TABLE 1 | Mean amounts of money returned per round in Study 1.
Baseline values First observed
values
Second observed
values
Final values
M SD M SD M SD M SD
CC (N = 25) 12.29 4.11 11.98 5.20 11.36 4.33 11.61 5.05
CS (N = 25) 11.44 4.10 11.32 4.02 9.10 4.80 10.30 4.69
SC (N = 25) 10.68 4.59 6.88 4.79 6.56 4.50 7.24 4.94
SS (N = 25) 11.59 4.27 7.86 5.29 6.26 5.35 6.28 5.24
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We performed a 2 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
the ﬁnal cooperativeness measure with two between–subject
factors (cooperative ﬁrst vs. selﬁsh ﬁrst; cooperative second vs.
selﬁsh second).We found that participants in the cooperative ﬁrst
condition cooperated more (M = 10.95, SD= 4.87) than those in
the selﬁsh ﬁrst condition (M = 6.76, SD= 5.07), F(1,96)= 17.63,
p < 0.001,η2p = 0.155; participants in the cooperative second
condition also cooperated more (M = 9.42, SD = 5.42) than
those in the selﬁsh second conditions (M = 8.29, SD = 5.33),
but this diﬀerence was not signiﬁcant, F(1,96) = 1.30, p > 0.250;
the interaction was also not signiﬁcant, Fs < 1, p > 0.250.
This results show the primacy eﬀect hypothesis is stronger
than the recency eﬀect, the environment participants exposed
to ﬁrst has a bigger eﬀect on participants’ subsequent behaviors
than the environment participants exposed to next. Moreover,
we conducted an independent-samples t-test revealed that
participants in the C-C condition behaved more cooperatively
(M = 11.61, SD= 5.05) than did participants in the S-S condition
(M = 6.28, SD = 5.25), t(48) = 3.66, p < 0.001. Observing
cooperative behaviors leads to more cooperative behaviors and
observing selﬁsh behaviors leads to more selﬁsh behaviors.
Finally, participants in the C-S condition are more cooperative
(M = 10.24, SD = 4.69) than those in the S-C condition
(M = 7.29, SD = 4.94). t(48) = 2.24, p = 0.030. This result also
lends support to the importance of the primacy eﬀect.
STUDY 2: COUNTERACTING PRIMACY
We conducted two additional experiments to examine how the
primacy eﬀect can be counteracted by recency exposure. In study
2a, we tested how long an individual needs to be immersed
in a cooperative environment in order for the more recent
exposure to counteract the negative eﬀect of exposure to a selﬁsh
environment ﬁrst. In study 2b, we want to know the analog: when
an individual is exposed to a cooperative environment ﬁrst, how
long an exposure to a subsequent selﬁsh environment is needed
in order to counteract the primacy eﬀect.
Method
Participants
In study 2a, 58 participants from Sun Yat-sen University
participated in the experiment for monetary payoﬀ. Participants
received a ¥10 payment plus 1% of the payment earned from
the economic game they played. One participant was excluded
because of a computer malfunction during the game. Fifty seven
participants (39 females, mean age = 22.79 years, SD = 3.60)
completed this study. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of two conditions: S-C-C-C (a selﬁsh environment ﬁrst
and then three times cooperative environments) and S-N-N-
N (a selﬁsh then three times neutral environment). This study
was approved by the Sun Yat-Sen University Human Research
Ethics Committee. All participants were fully informed of the
nature of the experiment and signed an informed consent to
participate.
In study 2b, ﬁfty (22 females, mean age = 22.10 years,
SD = 2.74) participants were recruited from Sun Yat-sen
University to complete this study. Participants received a ¥10
payment plus 1% of the payment earned from the economic game
they played. Participants were also randomly assigned to one of
two conditions: C-S-S-S (a cooperative environment and then
three consecutive selﬁsh environment), and the control condition
C-N-N-N (a cooperative and then three subsequent neutral
environment). This study was approved by the Sun Yat-Sen
University Human Research Ethics Committee. All participants
were fully informed of the nature of the experiment and signed
an informed consent to participate.
We followed similar procedures as in Study 1. Participants
played trust games as the Receiver with students from three
diﬀerent universities. They played with students from each
university and each round was with a diﬀerent person.
Speciﬁcally, they played with students from University 1 for
10 rounds, with those from University 2 for 10 rounds, and
then with those from University 3 for thirty rounds. For
University 2 and University 3, we had extra information to
show to participants before participants played with students
from these two universities. We told participants we recorded
how students from University 2 and University 3 play the
game among themselves. So before playing with students
from University 2, participants viewed ten rounds of previous
game playing among students from University 2 (i.e., both
Investor and Receiver were from University 2). The same
was true with University 3: participants viewed 10 rounds
of game playing among University 3 students before they
themselves actually played ten rounds of games with those
from University 3. Then they viewed another ten rounds of
games for University 3 again and played ten rounds with
University 3 again. Finally, they view 10 rounds of play for
University 3 for the third time, and played with University 3 for
the third time. Taken together, participants viewed 30 rounds
from University 3 and played 30 rounds with students from
University 3.
Participants were told speciﬁcally the students they played the
game with were diﬀerent from those viewed in the video, but they
were from the same university.
Speciﬁcally, for participants in the C-S-S-S condition,
Receivers from University 2 typically behave cooperatively and
Receivers from University 3 typically behave selﬁshly in the video
for participants to view. For those in the S-C-C-C condition,
University 2 was selﬁsh and University 3 was cooperative. For
those in the S-N-N-N and C-N-N-N conditions, University 3 was
designed to be a neutral environment.
Similar to study 1, participants played 10 rounds of games
with University 1. They decided how much they were going to
return ten times. Their uninformed decisions from University 1
were used for the basis to construct a cooperative environment,
a selﬁsh environment, and a neutral environment for them
to view later. The cooperative and selﬁsh environments were
constructed in the same way. The neutral environment was
constructed by selecting two decisions to add 1 yuan and
selecting another two decisions to subtract 1 yuan. The rest
of the decisions remained the same. The presentation order in
the video view is randomized so no participants suspected the
manipulation.
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Dependent measure
Our dependent measures were now ﬁve cooperativeness indexes,
measured by the average amount returned to students from each
of the three universities across 10 rounds.
Results
We performed an analysis-of-covariance (ANCOVA) using the
average amount returned in the three University 3 trials as the
dependent variables and the two conditions as between-subjects
factors, and the average amount participants returned to investors
from University 2 as a covariate.
In the study 2a, we compared participants who observed
three cooperative environments in the experimental condition to
participants in the control condition, who observed three neutral
environments.
There is a signiﬁcant increase in cooperativeness in the
experimental condition (SCCC) compared to the control
condition (SNNN) only in the third round of cooperative
exposure, F(1,54) = 4.66, p = 0.035, η2p = 0.079; there was
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence, in the ﬁrst or the second cooperative
treatment rounds, F(1,54)= 0.65, p> 0.250, and F(1,54)= 2.46,
p= 0.12, respectively (see Figure 4, Table 2).
In study 2b, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the experimental
condition (CSSS) compared to the control condition (CNNN)
across all three selﬁsh treatment environments. There is a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence after the ﬁrst exposure to a selﬁsh
environment, F(1,47) = 6.95, p = 0.011, η2p = 0.129; and
this diﬀerence persists for the second and third treatment
exposures as well, F(1,47) = 6.05, p = 0.0018, η2p = 0.114 and
F(1,47)= 6.69, p= 0.013, η2p = 0.125, respectively (see Figure 5,
Table 3).
Discussion
In study 1, we test Hypothesis 1 and ﬁnd conﬁrmatory evidence
for the primary eﬀect and suggestive evidence for the recency
eﬀect. We examined how participants behave in a neutral ﬁnal
round after exposure to two rounds where the environment
was manipulated to be either cooperative or selﬁsh. Holding the
second environment ﬁxed, participants who saw a cooperative
ﬁrst environment were more likely to cooperate in the neutral
ﬁnal round. Holding the second environment ﬁxed, participants
who saw a selﬁsh ﬁrst environment were more likely to be selﬁsh
in the neutral ﬁnal round. Taken together, this provides evidence
for the primacy eﬀect. As for the recency eﬀect, holding the ﬁrst
environment ﬁxed, participants were more likely to conform to
the behavior they witnessed in the second round environment,
but this was only statistically signiﬁcant when the ﬁrst round they
observed was cooperative. When the primacy and recency eﬀects
were considered together, the recency eﬀect was signiﬁcantly
smaller than the primacy eﬀect, with no signiﬁcant interaction
between the two.
The fact that the recency eﬀect was only observed in response
to the cooperative exposure is notable because the immediate
response to a selﬁsh environment was much stronger than
the immediate response to a cooperative environment. When
subjects thought they were interacting against selﬁsh partners,
their rate of cooperation declined signiﬁcantly from their
baseline. However, when subjects thought they were interacting
FIGURE 4 | Average return amounts of participants from each of the three universities across 10 rounds in Study 2a. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean.
TABLE 2 | Mean amounts of money returned per round in Study 2a.
Baseline values Observe selfish
values
First observe
cooperative/neutral
values
Second observe
cooperative/neutral
values
Third observe
cooperative/neutral
values
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
SCCC (N = 29) 10.57 4.85 9.57 5.22 9.94 5.79 10.21 6.06 10.96 6.59
SNNN (N = 28) 10.60 4.91 9.14 5.19 8.89 5.73 8.48 5.49 8.38 5.81
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FIGURE 5 | Average return amounts of participants from each of the three universities across ten rounds in Study 2b. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean.
TABLE 3 | Mean amounts of money returned per round in Study 2b.
Baseline
values
Observe
cooperative
values
First observe
selfish/neutral
values
Second observe
selfish/neutral
values
Third observe
selfish/neutral
values
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
CSSS (N = 25) 10.32 5.04 9.81 5.28 7.11 5.05 7.05 5.02 6.37 5.34
CNNN (N = 25) 10.08 4.62 10.07 5.30 9.50 4.56 9.26 5.02 9.06 4.74
with more cooperative partners, their rate of cooperation stayed
the same. This is not to say being in a cooperative environment
had no impact. As we see in Experiment 2, as well as in
prior literature (e.g., Isaac et al., 1994), left alone or in a
neutral environment, people tend to behave more selﬁshly with
repeated play, so the fact that they maintained the same level of
cooperativeness shows some impact of exposure to cooperation.
However, the immediate response to a cooperative environment
is still much smaller than the immediate response to a selﬁsh
environment. It is remarkable, then, that licensing of selﬁsh
behavior is at least in part context speciﬁc. I may feel more
justiﬁed in acting selﬁshly when playing against selﬁsh partners,
but when it comes to our measure of the recency eﬀect, it is
exposure to cooperation that is more likely to carry over to a new
environment.
First exposure to the norms of an environment is important. In
this setting, the novelty of the ﬁrst exposure to our environmental
manipulation was able to shift participants from the behavioral
norms they brought into the lab with them, as evidenced by how
post-treatment behavior diverges from pre-treatment behavior.
This is notable because the eﬀect of primacy lasts through
intervening rounds of exposure to another environment. The
point in time when someone is ﬁrst placed in an unfamiliar
situation and given an unfamiliar task is the most eﬀective
time to imprint new cultural norms. This ﬁrst exposure has
lasting impact but it could potentially be counteracted by the
most recent environmental exposure. In study 1, the eﬀect
of the most recent environment was dwarfed by the eﬀect
of the ﬁrst environment. Therefore, we turn to the results
in study 2 to examine how long it takes for participants to
assimilate to environmental norms they are being exposed
to.
Study 2 has two parts. The ﬁrst placed subjects in a cooperative
environment ﬁrst, and then counteracted that primacy eﬀect by
exposing them to three consecutive selﬁsh environments. We
compared their behavior with a control group who was also
exposed to a cooperative environment but then subsequently
exposed to three neutral environments. The second part of
study 2 placed subjects in a selﬁsh environment ﬁrst, and
then counteracted that selﬁshness by exposing them to three
cooperative environments. We compared those results to a
neutral control as well.
We found that the primacy eﬀect can indeed be counteracted
by recent exposure either through prolonged exposure or
through selﬁsh exposure. In the selﬁsh ﬁrst condition, three
consecutive exposures to cooperative environments completely
neutralized the primacy eﬀect. By the last round the most
recent environmental exposure came to dominate. The eﬀect
was even stronger in the cooperative condition. It only took
one round of exposure to a selﬁsh environment for the recency
eﬀect to come to dominate. The impact of exposure to a
more selﬁsh environment lasted longer and inﬂuenced behaviors
to a greater extent than exposure to a more cooperative
environment. One limitation of our study is that we can only
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compare the strength of our particular selﬁshness induction
and our particular cooperativeness induction. What we can say
is that because the cooperative and selﬁsh environments were
constructed symmetrically, we can make the general point that
if a person observes some amount of more selﬁsh behavior,
versus an equal amount of more cooperative behavior, exposure
to more selﬁsh behavior is more potent. In our study, the selﬁsh
environment was more potent in the short run. It took only
one exposure to a selﬁsh environment to counteract the primacy
eﬀect of a cooperative environment by inspiring selﬁsh play;
one exposure to a cooperative environment led to almost no
change in behavior. However, in the long run, after exposing
subjects to three consecutive selﬁsh or cooperative environments,
cooperation and selﬁshness were similarly eﬀective at reversing
the primacy eﬀect.
Two mechanisms are likely at work. There is the eﬀect
of the social norm itself, which through the conformity
mechanisms discussed earlier; people shift their behaviors to
match others’ behaviors that they observe (Cialdini et al.,
2006). However, there is a second mechanism which produces
an asymmetry between cooperative exposures versus selﬁsh
exposure. Moral regulation and moral licensing (Sachdeva et al.,
2009) gives people permission to act selﬁshly if they believe
they had performed a moral action in the past. Exposure to
an environment where others acted more selﬁshly makes one
feel good about their past behavior and therefore licenses the
participant to act selﬁshly in future interactions. The theory
of moral regulation applies in the other direction as well—
learning one acted more selﬁshly than others makes people feel
guilty and encourages more cooperative behavior. There is an
asymmetry here, however. As observed in Ho et al. (2015) moral
regulation is more likely to license selﬁsh behavior than it is to
engender cooperative behavior—we are more likely to use the
information about others to feel good about ourselves than to
feel guilty. While we did observe an increase in cooperation
when exposed to cooperative environments, the eﬀect was small
relative to the increase of selﬁshness while playing in a selﬁsh
environment. However, as noted above, participants were more
likely to carry the eﬀects of cooperative norms into subsequent
environments. The eﬀects of cooperation accreted slowly over
time, while the impact of selﬁsh exposure tended to happen all
at once.
Taken together, our ﬁndings provide guidance for establishing,
maintaining, merging, or changing an organizational culture as
new individuals or groups are integrated. Attention must be
given to the initial environment new members are exposed to
because the primacy eﬀect is strong. Additionally, exposure to
selﬁsh environments must be carefully monitored, as the eﬀect of
selﬁsh norms will be more diﬃcult to counteract; in the short run,
cooperative environments were largely ineﬀective. With repeated
exposure, however, cooperative norms can take hold, suggesting
the potential for long run organizational change.
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